

A Healthy and Sustainable Vision for Long Beach




Spring 2011

Green L.A. Port Working Group

ICTF & SCIG Proposed Rail Yards

Two proposed rail yard projects threaten the health, safety, and quality of life of Long Beach residents and workers. BNSF Railway is planning to construct a huge new yard, the Southern California International Gateway (SCIG). Union Pacific Railroad is planning to expand its existing yard, the Intermodal Container Transfer Facility (ICTF or UP ICTF).



There Can Be a Different Vision for Long Beach

The yards are 4–5 miles from the Ports and are very close to homes and schools. Together they will handle 3 million containers a year. Current plans are for each container to arrive at the rail yard on a truck traveling from the Ports through our local communities.


All of the containers that these yards would handle are heading to destinations more than 500 miles away from Long Beach.

The railroad companies and the Ports try to claim that these new rail yards will be “green,” but the reality is that the yards will instead add significant air pollution, noise, industrial blight, traffic congestion, and health risks to our community.

There can be a different vision for

Long Beach, with strategies to allow our economy to truly grow green. These approaches could render the proposed rail yards unnecessary and minimize the negative impacts to the immediate communities surrounding the yards.

Alternatives to the Proposed SCIG & ICTF Rail Yard Projects



Green L.A. Port Working Group
Spring 2011 Newsletter

“Our Community has Boundaries”: Los Angeles’s Asian and Latinx¹ Immigrant Activists on Embodiment, Race, Class, and Morality

NADIA YOUNG-NA KIM

“They have no idea...because they live in places where they don’t know anything about pollution.”

—Laura, Long Beach Alliance for Children with Asthma

WHEN I WALKED INTO THE SMALL ROOM set off from the raucous public comment meeting, the contrast between the two was tangible. The crowd, amplified din, and the sheen of bright fluorescent lights gave way to a hush, dimly-lit room dotted with a few people sitting in front of a row of outdated computers—some typing, some ruminating. I found one of my favorite people there, Laura, the staff community liaison and widely-adored activist of the non-profit Long Beach Alliance for Children with Asthma (LBACA), standing nicely dressed in her typical poised manner, supervising the computer process. “What are the people doing in front of the computers?” I asked. “They’re typing in their comments instead of going up to the mic. Are you going to speak tonight? Why don’t you go up to the mic?” Laura’s question met my mind still enshrined in surprise from the emphasis that Mexican immigrant activists like her had placed on poverty as defining membership in “the community.” I completely missed the fact that she actually wanted me, a middle-class Ph.D.-holding professor, to step up to the mic—that my social class (and even perhaps my non-Latina) status might prompt the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) officials to *hear* me in a way they did not her and her neighbors.

Thinking that I was in fact respecting her self-described community boundaries and that I was showing reflexivity, I replied, “Oh, I don’t feel right about going up there when I’m not a member of the community, taking time away from others who actually live here.” In her typical measured calm, she betrayed no disappointment but remained persistent, suggesting, “OK, why don’t you write your comment on the computer then?” Satisfied that a viable alternative existed, I replied, “OK, great!” It would not be until the end of my fieldwork some years later that I saw this moment anew, with 20/20 vision and fresh perspective. Immediately, the warm blood of embarrassment and regret rushed through me. In the moment, I had not sufficiently oriented my mind to the fact that Laura had possessed a multi-dimensional view of class. As such, I did not intuit her disappointment that I neglected to use my class (and other) privileges to help uplift her community in the most forceful way possible: with my body’s actual voice and presence before the elites. My head was so buried in the conceptual analysis and in insider/outsider dichotomies (Merton 1972; see Vo 2000), that I completely missed the human connection—I had no idea, in effect, that she saw me as a symbolic member of her beloved community.

The moment, and my reflection thereafter, awoke me to the types of boundaries that marginalized groups draw to determine who is “us” and who is the political opponent, and what social axes might influence those choices. In pursuing these questions, I found that issues of embodiment and morality were critical for both the Latin@ and Asian American activists, but that they chose different systems of inequality to draw boundaries and to determine the main source of their suffering. For instance, the majority of the Mexican immigrant activists like Laura taught me that their community was the poor who had to fight the immoral “healthy wealthy,” that is, classism was the key form of oppression. The majority of the Asian American activists taught me that their community of color had to battle the “white healthy wealthy,” that racism was the key source of their suffering. When pursuing the question of why the difference, a transnational perspective on the arc of these groups’ livelihoods proved paramount.

In forging the political divisions of “we, the embodied community” against “them, the (white) healthy wealthy,” the Mexican ethnic and Asian American activists prioritized inequalities of the body born, respectively, from classism and racism. In other words, “our” bodies are relegated to poverty or made sick by racism, while “their” bodies are healthy because they are primarily affluent or White (sometimes both) (see Hall 1991). This is by definition a moral claim, as the embodied community believes that the generally healthier government and corporate elites neglect (Kim n.d.) and placate them out of the lack of empathy that wealth and whiteness engendered. Drawing on Michèle Lamont’s work on how morality underpins boundary-making, I demonstrate how transnational, contextual, and strategic reasons inform why first-generation Mexican ethnics’ boundaries hinge on class, and why those of Asian Americans pivot on race/ethnicity.

Data and Methods

This study employs a mixed-methodological and intersectional approach of three and a half years of ethnographic participant-observation with Asian American and Mexican ethnic activists and allies in Los Angeles. I also conducted in-depth interviews with a subset of activists. Finally, I conducted a systematic analysis of political literature, public policy reports, and presentations. Data was collected between mid-2008 to late summer 2010, then again from mid-2011 to late 2013.

The ethnographic participant observation and interviews drew mostly from members and unaffiliated allies of Community Based Organizations (CBOs) serving the predominantly Asian American and Latinx populations in LA’s port-refinery belt cities: Carson, Long Beach, Wilmington, and the surrounding area.

The first, People’s Core (PCORE), is predominantly staffed by Filipinx ethnics and mostly serves their co-ethnics who comprise 21% of Carson’s population but also the smaller numbers of Samoan, Cambodian, hapa, and other Asian-descent groups who reside there. PCORE focuses its activism on Environmental Justice—namely, the effects of port, railway, and freeway diesel pollution and oil refineries on local schools and on the broader community—and on issues of immigration reform, military veterans’ benefits, tenant rights, and the like.

The second, Long Beach Alliance for Children with Asthma (LBACA), boasts a diverse staff that serves the Latinx primarily but secondarily the Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders (AAPIs) who call Long Beach home, namely the Cambodian Americans who compose 4% of the city (~20,000). LBACA focuses its organizing on curbing the same asthma-inducing pollution as PCORE but also provides health services, a mix of service and activism that many activist groups provide today (Luft 2009; Shah 2011; Tang 2011) and that has roots in the Black Panther Party (Nelson 2011).

The third, Communities for a Better Environment (CBE), mostly serves Latinx and AAPI residents but works with people of color from all the listed cities. CBE specializes in the above-noted Environmental Justice campaigns but also power plants and smaller polluting businesses; although I partook in various CBE actions and events, I spent most of my time with its youth activist program for which the organization is renowned. Both LBACA and CBE overlap in some capacity with the immigrant rights movement.

I also worked with three predominantly Mexican-/Latinx-serving organizations. First, Coalition for a Safe Environment (CFASE) is run by a multi-generation Mexican American leader and his small Latinx staff (and assisted by a multi-ethnic coalition of activists), and largely serves the near 87% of Latinx (largely Mexican) who comprise the working-class Wilmington population. LBACA, mentioned above, was the second one. I also worked with Community Partners Council (CPC), a mostly service-providing organization that overlapped with LBACA on Environmental Justice work when it was not focused on immigrant rights, crime prevention, gang reduction, gaining green space/parks, and the like.

The three supplementary organizations with whom I worked informally and intermittently were East Yard Communities for Environmental Justice (EYCEJ), Semillas de Esperanza (SE), and Latinos in Action (LIA). I connected with EYCEJ by way of the charismatic leader’s and the members’ regular presence in

organizing circles and by my close relationship with Laura, who left LBACA to work for EYCEJ. The organization mostly serves the (unauthorized) Mexican immigrant population of working-class East LA. The interface between me and Latinos in Action was Ceci, who also left LBACA to work with LIA, which serves the Latinx population in Long Beach and the surrounding environs. LIA's core issues have long been immigration rights and education.

Regarding the Asian American informants, I spent three and a half years in the field with up to twenty-four staff activists and activist residents. Of those, I was able to secure in-depth interviews with ten women and five men, all of whom self-identified as such. The gender imbalance is explained by the predominance of women in Environmental (Health) Justice movements (Brown and Ferguson 1995; Kirk 1999; Sze 1999). The average age of the Asian ethnic informants was 39, and the immigrants' average length of time in the United States was thirty years. Most of the women worked in the paid labor force, as CBO staff, K-12 teachers, child daycare owners, and social workers, while the remainder were undergraduate or graduate students and stay-at-home mothers. All but one of the men were paid activist staff. Most of the women and men had grown up in lower- to mid-middle class households, were presently earning middle-class incomes, and were citizens or legal residents.²

Regarding the Latinx informants, I conducted thirty in-depth, semi-structured interviews mostly with the staff, leaders, members, and loose affiliates of the noted organizations. Twenty-two identified as women and eight as men. About nine of the women were currently working at the time of the interviews, nearly all had held odd jobs at some point or other (usually low-skilled service, such as in factories or as domesticas), and the remainder were homemakers/stay-at-home mothers. The average age was 39, the average length of time in the U.S. for the immigrants was eighteen and a half years, and thirteen activists were either citizens or legal residents, six of whom were second-generation Latinx.

For the final method, I conducted systematic analysis of CBO and affiliate literature, public policy reports, and presentations so as to ascertain how the groups and their members politically framed issues, inequalities, and injustices; how they strategized per this framing; as well as to help me recall the purpose and details of events and meetings.

Although some of the Asian American and Latinx activists and their Environmental Justice organizations periodically came together to work in loose Southern California coalitions (e.g., Coalition for Environmental Health and Justice, the Green LA Port Working Group)—most of them often worked discretely from the other, owing to a focus on different cities and neighborhoods (hence, populations) and on different political strategies (as noted, grassroots organizing, service provision, or, most typically, a mix).³ And although I recruited from Community Based Organizations for my sample, I focused on the activists and allies rather than on the CBOs per se. What motivated my decision was my key research question, which is not how *organizations* are redefining politics from an immigrant-specific standpoint (which is more the province of organizational sociology), but how the *activists* who move in and out of these CBOs and the *social movements* they make and remake, are doing so. I often found the membership in these collectives to be fluid and seasonal, and therefore organizations were not the most reliable measure of what shaped the subjective dimensions of politicization, meaning-making, and race/class/citizenship inequality, and in turn, how these subjective dimensions related to the larger CBOs. Where organizations matter for my analysis, however, I make note of it.

Regarding process, I always communicated in English with all of the Asian American first-generation and the youth activists, whether in the field or in formal interview settings. I spoke a combination of basic Spanish and English with the majority of the Latin@ immigrant and youth activists; and for formal interviews, a fluent and bilingual Spanish speaker was always present to translate.

Theoretical Background: Environmental Justice and Boundary-making

Lamont's (2000) classic work on "symbolic boundaries" and "boundary work" found that, owing to respective U.S. and French policy differences on welfare, the U.S. working class positioned itself as

above and morally superior to the poor, while blue-collar French aligned themselves with the poor. Morality—or the capacity for self-discipline, responsibility, and compassion to keep one’s life, and that of others, in order (p. 3)—anchored these boundary lines. These lines were premised on who they were, and equally important, on who they were not. Such a conceptualization of boundary-drawing harkens to Fredrik Barth’s (1998) work on ethnicity wherein group lines are drawn based on who falls within, and without, the boundary.

In constructing themselves in opposition to others, or doing “boundary work,” Lamont’s U.S. and French working classes considered moral standards to function as “an alternative to economic definitions of success,” and to offer “a way to maintain dignity and to make sense of their lives in a land where the American dream is ever more out of reach.” In this vein, Lamont’s White male working class judged professionals and managers “to lack personal integrity and sincerity and to have poor interpersonal relationships” (p. 3), thereby using their morality standards to decouple wealth from moral worthiness and to position themselves above those with money.


In addition to moral boundary-making, my study also centers scholarship on the body within the sociological immigration and Environmental (Health) Justice (EJ) literature. I also put citizenship front and center in the EJ literature (see also Park and Pellow 2011). While Environmental Justice research has focused nobly on the race and class causes of disproportionate pollution, it has left wanting our grasp of how the body/embodyment anchors definitions of citizenship as well as political identities and boundaries. When we make body/embodyment primary in the Environmental Justice and immigration sociology literatures, we more readily grasp why the Latinx subjects did not finger racism as the main cause of their suffering despite it being one veritable cause.

To be sure, body/embodyment has been a cornerstone of American Studies perspectives on immigration and Environmental Justice, but these studies have not tied together embodyment, emotionality, citizenship, and transnationality in a manner that could explain the activists in my study. For instance, work by Kim (2008) has shown that the racial positioning, identities, and politics of immigrant groups—in her case, Korean Americans—could not be understood without an analysis of the transnational nature of racialized colonialism, (neo)imperialism, and global culture. It is the aim of this chapter to recognize this reality as the Asian American and Latin@ Angeleno activists do.

Moral Boundary Lines and Political Culprits

The Mexican immigrant activists construct themselves as “we the embodied community” in a way that subverts state and mainstream discourse on their group as “illegals.” Similarly, the Asian American activists roundly reject the derogation of them as “inscrutable foreigners,” “non-Americans,” and war-torn refugees.

The activists determine who is within and without the community by deeming the *embodied community* as sick by design and deeming those outside their community—particularly, those in positions of power—as the non-empathic “healthy wealthy” (or the “white healthy wealthy,” per the Asian Americans’ sentiment). By delineating an us/them division on the basis of who has empathy (us) and who does not (them), the Los Angeles activists underscore the following index of morality: “compassion to keep one’s life, and that of others, in order” (Lamont 2000:3). In other words, this is a morality that state and corporate elites, and their systems, lack. Throwing into relief such boundary-drawing, long-time community leader Laura, whom we met in the opening vignette, responded to my question about whether or not President Obama, who she admired, and the federal government played any role in West Long Beach’s air quality.



Nadia: If you become a citizen, do you think that you will be satisfied with voting for people? ... Maybe they're more like Obama, ... would you be satisfied with just voting and calling the senator and the representatives saying, "Please pass this so that we can have less diesel pollution in our communities"—do you think that you will focus more on doing those kinds of activities rather than doing your community work that you've been doing?

Laura: *Never. My community is first.*

Nadia: That comes first. So even if you could vote later, you will do just as much community work [as before]?

Laura: Yeah, mhm, yeah ... It's because the community needs to be educated. We need to include ourselves. Also, I think that by educating ourselves we give ourselves a better future.

Nadia: Do you feel like President Obama, or like the national level representatives, do they know local issues?

Laura: (scoffing) Um, no ... They have no idea... because they live in places where they don't know anything about pollution.


Laura makes clear her political identity and commitment—"My community is first"—but also how she draws a dividing line between the political Other who "[doesn't] know anything about pollution" and her community, who has to educate and empower itself about living in a life-threatening environment, something they wished they never had to deal with. The community, therefore, is the victim who must clean up after the political and moral neglect exacted by the "healthy wealthy." She is indignant and emphatic, for instance, when she remarks, "They have no idea... they don't know anything about pollution," imbibing the "they" not just with the privilege of ignorance, but with the immorality of killing her community softly (see Alexander 2016). This line in the sand is also what rooted her politics in grassroots community activism and *not* in the voting, campaigning, or civic office of formal, electoral politics. These are powerful words from a member of an immigrant group who has long been encouraged to assimilate into mainstream politics—indeed, scolded and shamed for not doing so fast enough.

On the "healthy wealthy" dismissing people of color's suffering in a bid to profit from it, activists like Vega, a Filipina-Mexican activist PTA (Parent-Teacher Association) mother who worked with the Filipinx-centered group PCORE, painted corporate and government elites—even elementary school principals—as selling their souls for the highest price. "They're crooks," she remarks. "They don't really seem to be in tune. They [elected and agency officials] seem to be getting paid by the corps, and I think some of the LAUSD [Los Angeles Unified School District] principals are paid to be silent, to let them [the corps] pollute."

Another organizing moment with PCORE was also instantly revealing of the activists' boundary work and morality tropes. One of PCORE's signature events was the annual Earth Day festival, a less politically-charged event organized for the community with the hopes of raising consciousness and recruiting members to the struggle. Working with John, the leader of CFASE and many other Environmental Justice organizations in the area, the 2012 Earth Day event involved a segment of political street theater in which Filipino and Mexican American children held candles with the logos of all of Carson's polluting behemoths taped to them: Shell, Valero, BP. Wearing grim expressions and in a somber tone, the Filipinx and Latinx youth recited the damage that the toxic chemical emissions did to their young bodies. It struck me that this was an effective visual of the way Carson activists and allies drew boundaries, as well as Lamont's findings about disentangling morality from the upper class. The seemingly disembodied and immoral "they" polluted for profit, largely with impunity, and without concern for the less affluent bodies of color that became invisible statistics on reports. Hence, the youth activists presented their bodies for

the public to see—the bodies that coughed, wheezed, itched, suffered, and died as a result of neglect.

The Asian American lower-middle class and Mexican working-class activists, akin to Lamont's (2000) subjects, judged the professionals and managers of the (white) healthy wealthy "to lack personal integrity and sincerity and to have poor interpersonal relationships" (p. 3). In this way they, like the U.S. and French working classes that Lamont studied, decoupled wealth from moral worthiness *to position themselves above* those with more money; these moral standards functioned as "an alternative to economic definitions of success." In contrast to Lamont's U.S. working class, however, the Latinx activists did not reconnect class status and morality as a way to derogate the abject poor and Blacks; rather, they imbued poor and working-class people, like themselves, with moral entitlement and the authority to eke justice from the mostly upper-class White American men (and their institutions) who withheld it.



Climate Strike
Chambers Street, Manhattan (September 20, 2019)
Photo by Chinatown Partnership

Mexican Ethnic Activists on Embodied Classism & the Moral Problem of Class

For the Latinx activists, the boundary that marked who was in the embodied community, and who was out of it, pivoted on class and class-based morality. Marta articulated this while narrating the political gulf between her community and the "healthy wealthy."

Marta: On one occasion when I went to talk [testify] I told [the officials] that you do not understand us because you live very far away from us in the mountains [Los Angeles or Orange County foothills]. You do not have contamination. *If you live in this neighborhood where I live, where there is contamination and your children get sick, you will understand me.*⁴

Nadia: What did they say [in response]?

Marta: They stood quiet. They didn't say anything. They just look at each other. Like my son said, "He [that official] got mad." It's true. They don't pay attention. That is the truth: *when people have money they leave. But they have a beautiful mansion and they have a good neighbor. It doesn't interest them.*⁵

In making this statement, Marta specifies two criteria for membership in the community of which she is part: first, "we" are the impoverished and second, "we" are those who have to breathe toxic air and who thus have to care for sick neighbors and children. She conflates the two criteria, as many of the other interviewees do, since one was rarely disentangled from the other. With respect to moral boundary-drawing, she is explicit that she excludes the rich and the powerful from her community's bounds, who are too busy intentionally disengaging or getting mad or living in clean air communities to feel empathy, to understand, to have compassion. Particularly striking about Marta's narrative is the latter part where she excludes the officials for their alleged use of wealth to leave or avoid overly-polluted neighborhoods and the resultant life-threatening illnesses.

I was also struck by how consistent and impassioned Marta's co-ethnics were about the centrality of poverty to defining their group and their politics. Early in my fieldwork, this was the unexpected response I got from Laura, then LBACA's activist liaison, when I asked what she meant by "community."

Nadia: When you say community, do you mean the people who live in the specific area, or..?

Laura: Not only us immigrants, no, it's low-income.

Nadia: Low-income people, so class?

Laura: Yeah, yeah, class. I'm not talking about Latinos, Black, or.. [other racial/ethnic groups who live here].

A relatively new organizer, Myra, similarly cited class, not race, as the system's motivation for disproportionate pollution.

Nadia: Would they do the same thing [pollute] in a poor Anglo community? In a poor Anglo neighborhood?

Myra: I think so. I think so.... I think it's people who are just low-income, who are not educated because of it.

Similarly, hard-working LBACA staff community liaison and forty-three-year-old mother Liliana, immediately invoked class bias when I asked her whether or not she thought state and corporate officials had stereotypes about Latina activists like her. Liliana reasoned, "Why they do all the bad things [they do] is [because] wherever lives the low-income people, they [the officials] know [the low-income people] don't know that much. Low-income means the less money you have, I think, the less education you have because it's hard for someone that doesn't have any education to send kids to college and make income."

To be sure, in my early days in the field, I was somewhat surprised at how much the mostly Mexican Latinx activists prioritized class. I had assumed that they and their activist colleagues would instead point to race (we Latinos), ethnicity (we Mexicans), and/or legal status (we undocumented, which is racialized). Yet I was asking myself, "Why would race/ethnicity not be as important to activists who have long been racialized, surveilled, detained, and deported as 'brown illegals?'" Furthermore, social science data have long shown racism to explain a slew of environmental injustices in this country, as even middle-class people of color are often polluted upon to a greater extent than working-class White Americans (Bullard 1993; Bullard and Wright 2009). In this way, the activists could have just as easily deemed nativist racism to be the main cause—or the main *co-cause*—of their environmental, immigration, and educational injustices; by extension, race could have been the basis, or co-basis, of their insider/outsider and moral boundary-drawing.

To unpack this puzzle, my analytical deep dive revealed that a transnational approach and framework were critical. Kim's (2008) previous research on Korean American racial formation had made clear the centrality of the pre-migrant context, and the ongoing transnational connections to it, whenever immigrants navigated the politics of race, nation, ethnicity, and related social inequalities in the local context. This transnational reality could not have been truer for the Latinx immigrants' political consciousness in *El Norte*, for the main oppression that the activists suffered in Mexico was poverty. That is, the Mexican activists' transnational and dual positioning was as "poor people"—*not as racial/ethnic minorities*—prompting them to make class primary.

Also influential are the politics of low-wage unauthorized immigrants under globalization who define themselves in terms of immigrant (not citizenship, nation-state) rights. For instance, Das Gupta (2006) found that immigrant activists like the South Asian taxi drivers and domestic violence survivors in the Northeast United States saw themselves as vested with a "transnational complex of rights" that attended them no matter the border crossed and no matter the documents held. In the face of polluters, politicians, and government agencies, the Angeleno activists of my study identified first as members of the "poor" (see Das Gupta 2006:19), aligning themselves with the impoverished labor migrants spawned by neoliberal capitalism and championed by anti-globalization social movements. In this way, the Mexican immigrant

Environmental Justice activists' preferred method was to meld universal personhood—a human rights tenet—and social group membership as the oppressed poor (see Das Gupta 2006:19) in order to define their political center and their political selves.

As noted, another factor behind the weaker focus on race was the fact that the activists did not suffer (systemic) racism in Mexico. Their membership in Mexico's dominant, majority population meant that they were not ensnared in racism's net of exclusion and bias; they came to the U.S. with a weaker consciousness about race/racism or the need for it, save certain situational exceptions. Upon inquiring about their racialized cultural backgrounds, for instance, none of the Latinx activists identified with an indigenous identity (or with less acknowledged Asian and Black Mexican backgrounds). Rather, in line with the prevailing cultural *mestizo* ("mestizaje") national identity, a substantial number had light skin and European-esque features, while others appeared more mixed.

Paralleling Frankenberg's (1993) work on white racial discourse in the United States, one of the biggest indicators of a life without systemic racism is one's lexicon; the Latinx activists, just like the white women in Frankenberg's study, did not cite racism as affecting their lives in Mexico, did not racialize themselves in their articulations about their lives there, did not see how their lives were syncretic with those of the racially oppressed in Mexico, and understood themselves in relation to other Mexican injustices (classism in my study). Moreover, Latin American social desirability norms have long prompted less overt talk about race and racism (Telles 2006), whereby race and racism are oft-conflated and identified only in their most overt, institutional forms (Roth and Kim 2013). To make a U.S. analogy, race and racism might come up but only in relation to the KKK or (neo)Nazis or to Republican presidential nominees who dub their migrant brethren "rapists" and "criminals" as part of the global wave of far-right populist racism targeting migrants.

Furthermore, class loomed largest in these first-generation activists' political sensibilities because, in their transnational experience, the rich gringo country did not end up being a complete escape from Mexico's grinding poverty either. Poverty was therefore a human rights struggle, one that was global and transnational, and that reached every corner of this hauntingly divided world. Such a perspective was lucid in the unapologetic language of the activists. Of the countless Latinx with whom I spoke in the field, I heard not a single unauthorized immigrant equivocate on whether their group deserved to be in the United States. It was a given that they did—a non-starter and a no-brainer.

Some of the respondents were quite explicit about the transnational scope of their political oppression and sensibility. While Marta, for instance, was fully cognizant of and forthcoming about anti-Latinx racism in the United States, she used the example of Mexico's politicians to prove that race was not the main reason why American politicians dismissed them. She articulated this point when I queried about the demographic background of most of the U.S. officials to whom she testified at public comments. She initially replied, "The majority are men. Americanos [Anglos]." Upon asking whether or not she thought that the officials' status as "Americanos" had an impact on why they were not empathizing with them and fighting pollution, she remarked:

It is not because they are just American [Anglo] men. Over there in Mexico, we are Mexican and [it's] the same thing when there is politics. They don't pay attention to us ... To put it simply, they are people who are not in a lower class like us. They separate themselves from us and they don't know the people.

Marta believed that the gap between rich and poor ultimately explained why political elites abused their power rather than served their impoverished constituents—and the similarity between Mexico and the United States was proof enough.

Even when transnationalism did not anchor the activists' articulations, their lived realities between their Mexican origins and West Long Beach, USA affirmed each other in unexpected ways. For instance,

the extreme segregation and weak racial socialization of the Mexican immigrant activists in Long Beach meant a day-to-day existence consorting mostly with other Latinx immigrants (many *sin papeles*) in the racially segregated barrio. There, one did not have to know a word of English and largely did not have to interact with White Americans within dominant White institutions. In industrial, working-class West Long Beach (zip code 90810), for instance, Latinx comprise over 53% of the overall population, about 20,000 (Whites comprise only 20%; Blacks, the next largest, a mere 0.5%). The Latinx's removal from day-to-day interaction with White America could be analogized to what Young (2006) found in his study of inner-city Black American men who reported less racism than (upper) middle-class Blacks (see also Feagin and Sikes 1994).

The weak day-to-day encounter with White America thus boded well with the activists' experience in Mexico of not having to think about race as members of the racial majority; it was not the master social categorization system in their U.S. neighborhoods either. To be sure, race mattered in the United States when they politically engaged (or fought with) White America, and dealt with the broader nativist racism that derogated and deported them as "illegals." Race could even matter in Mexico, albeit more indirectly, when they heard about what "Gringolandia" was doing to their immigrant brethren in *El Norte*.

AAPI Activists on Environmental Racism (and Classism)

In contrast to the Mexican immigrants, the Filipinx as well as Samoan, Cambodian, and hapa Asian Americans emphasized race/ethnicity as the key boundary line around their embodied community and as the moral beast to slay. Why so different from the Mexican immigrant activists? The most obvious answer is the middle-class and legal status of the Asian American activists, save for a few exceptions. While the terror of illegality or living in low-income undocumented neighborhoods was something most of the Filipinx and other Asian American activists did not have to endure, the Filipinx activists could have put the wealthy in the "hot seat" rather than "whitey;" alternatively, the Asian American activists could have combined the statuses and put the "white wealthy" in the seat. On balance, however, they articulated whiteness first. In opposition, they talked about "our Filipino community," "we minorities," and "we people of color." Certainly, they invoked language about their weaker economic privilege vis-a-vis state and corporate elites, as we shall see, but never did I hear them lead with oppression by the wealthy.

Furthermore, the similarities between the Mexican and Filipinx ethnic activists make their divergent political identities and boundaries somewhat confounding. Both sets of immigrants hail from countries beset by colonization and neo(imperialism), including at the hands of behemoths Spain and the United States; both groups are macro-racialized as threatening or exotic "forever foreigners" no matter how "American" (read: white) they act; and, yet, the political difference persisted. Another potential factor was the more explicit Filipinx focus of the PCORE organization, although it avoided officially naming itself "a Filipino group" so as not to appear as if other racial/ethnic groups, or their issues, would be excluded. Effectively, PCORE was founded and predominantly staffed by Filipinx Americans.

In comparison, the Latinx-dominant LBACA, CPC, and CFASE were less willing than PCORE to concede a racial/ethnic membership or focus. At the same time, these Latinx-dominant groups were well aware that the vast majority of the residents, staff, and community members in these movements were Mexican or other Latinx ethnics. They were aware that outsiders who visited noticed that Spanish was the dominant language at every meeting and event. Indeed, Spanish language translators usually dotted the sidelines whispering the romance language into devices during English-speaking segments; every document was written in the Spanish language or on one side of a bilingual rendition; the culinary spread was usually Mexican/Latinx fare; the dances were *ballet folklórico* and *danza Azteca*; and resources from Catholic churches were often marshalled. Still, these activists were not inspired to organize explicitly as "Mexican ethnics" or "Latino/as" so as to keep the floodlight on class and to be as politically expansive as possible.

Our Racially Embodied Community

While class was always in the picture in some way shape or form, as we shall see, race/ethnicity was the decided fixture; it was the unflagging principle around which the Asian American activists, irrespective of generation, organized Environmental (Health) Justice events. Given the nagging paucity of time, energy, and resources for most activists, they would often prefer to fold Environmental Justice issues within an annual Filipino Cultural Day (or Festival) than organize EJ events sans the nods to ethnic/racial history, culture, and discourse. In Fall 2015, for instance, I found myself helping PCORE's Pia, a first-generation activist, spread the word on Filipino American History Month. The event that year was special given the added celebration of Larry Itliong Day, formalized to much historic fanfare by Governor Jerry Brown earlier that Spring.

A perfect blend of the ethnic/racial and the environmental, Pia was leading the charge to celebrate Itliong, the oft-forgotten Filipino American labor leader of Delano, California, who, in fact, led the 1965 grape strike against agribusiness's refusal to pay a union wage long before Cesar Chavez and the United Farm Workers had decided that striking was the way to go. Prior to Delano, Itliong had helped establish the Alaska Cannery Workers Union in the 1930s and had helped secure eight-hour work days with overtime pay. Pia helped organize the event's program, featuring awards for labor and community leadership, youth achievement, and medals of honor for advocacy work on behalf of Filipino American World War II veterans, all in Itliong's name.

The legacy of Itliong is much more than that of a labor leader; he was also an Environmental (Health) Justice organizer who fought for improved working conditions on the job, including his opposition to toxic pesticide-spraying of workers and his advocacy for organic produce. Although the event was namely to publicize Filipino American history, heritage, culture, and Itliong's name and legacy, Pia was well aware that none of these was divorced from Environmental (Health) Justice. Even for other organized events, such as the more politically innocuous Earth Day festivals hosted to recruit people to the struggle, an event would rarely close without some nod to the Filipinx community or without an extensive announcement of future events and campaigns related to the plight of "FilAms."

Also influential was the Asian Americans' more frequent and intense engagement of White America. Citizenship status, longer U.S. tenures, and less segregated neighborhoods afforded close, sustained relations with White America in workplaces and schools, greater access to U.S. race discourse and movements (given English language ability born of U.S. colonialism), and longer socialization by American race norms given the immigrants' average of twelve-plus years longer in the United States. In Carson, relative to West Long Beach, the racial groups were not so disparate in size from one another: the Latinx "of any race" were 38.6% of the population, 25.6% were Asian American and Pacific Islander (dominated by the Filipinx at roughly 21%), and both White and Black Americans comprised 23.8% each. Not only was West Long Beach more of a Latinx concentration, it was in the best legal interest of the unauthorized subset of the populace not to interact on a day-to-day basis with White America and its institutions.

Unlike the Latinx activists, most of whom were women and mothers who did not work full time, the Asian American activists worked with Anglos in the City of Carson's Parks and Recreation department and school district, the Torrance Unified School District, the PTA, in social work offices, and, among the youth, at school. The Mexican activists' quasi-regular interaction with White America was at the doctor's office (to treat asthma or other maladies) and, politically, at City Hall and public meetings. The small number who worked prior to committing to full-time organizing usually encountered Whites in their more affluent homes as domesticas (but even then, they would often clean an empty house).

Another stark contrast from the Mexican ethnics had to do with transnationality. Specifically, the Asian ethnics had strong transnational political histories in, and ties to, their ethnic homeland, which translated into a strong racial consciousness. That is, the Asian ethnics' emphasis on race owed in part to their pre-U.S. activism and/or their ongoing transnational ties to progressive political movements there.

Membership in such a transnational social field persistently highlighted White U.S. (masculine) power over the sending country, irrespective of the political issue at hand.

As one example, the Asian Americans' families and relatives were deeply involved in electoral politics and grassroots activism both in the ethnic homeland and in the United States. In further contrast to the Mexican subjects, the Asian American activists also held strong transnational identities and were part of activist efforts in their national origins (or were aspiring thus). Cindy, a Pacific Islander American, exemplified both: her Samoan family has long been active in political circles, and her own sense of longing for and repulsion by her island "home" has indelible ties to that political history. The very reason that she and her family abruptly left Samoa in 1971 was a (violent) political conflict involving a village chief and her father, a public figure on the island. She described how her departure from the islands when she was age five was actually spurred by the chief's jealousy over her family's overwhelming success as a fishing business and livestock-filled plantation.

There was a chief in the village, my mom's village where we lived, who was jealous of my parents And one day my dad went to check on the animals up at the farm and someone had cut one of [the pig's] legs off! And then her new litter of piglets, ...someone just chopped them all in half! ... And another time someone killed one of the cows. Then my dad one night—thankfully, he didn't take any of his guns—he just took a machete, he went to the home of that chief My dad swung the machete to decapitate him He didn't kill that man, but then all the young men [nearby] jumped [my dad] and beat him almost to death And our relatives started preparing to get our papers for us to leave 'cause my dad was banished from the village. And we were supposed to go to New Zealand, but my mom's auntie here told her, "Come to America," and we did.

Roselie came from similar beginnings in the Philippines.

Yeah, our family is a political family. My father was a part of the first Constitution, [an] elected official of the Constitution of the Philippines. With my father's side we are a political family; congressmen, mayors, we're always in the political field. My mom is a ...doctor...so [she and her side] weren't in the political atmosphere but they were still involved...that's why here in Carson, it's very strong. On the Filipino vote we might not be the majority but politically we're active.

Roselie attributes the political prowess of her Filipinx American community in Carson directly to their deep political engagements prior to migration. Pia, whom we met earlier, grew up in an impoverished village on the Philippine archipelago, immigrated as an adult and was an engaged transnational subject and transnational activist: she boasted organizing experience in her origin and was part of a dense activist network between the U.S. and the Philippines. She, like Cindy from Samoa, had the added characteristic of parents and relatives who were highly active in the formal political realm and in grassroots politics.

Pia: My dad, he was a union leader I remember my grandmother helping out in the campaign of the governor And I grew up debating politics. [Before I came to the U.S.]...my political position was mainly in the student movement in the '70s [fighting the Marcos dictatorship] I was already active with the women's movement in the Philippines, in '84. I was setting up GABRIELA Philippines [a renowned NGO that defied Marcos and advocated for women's issues] *Right now, because we live in Carson, I'm more interested in the environment because I can feel the impact We got pulled into the local issues [but] it was essentially born out of the Philippine Network which [focused on] human rights issues. The Philippine Network pulled out when the [military] bases weren't there. That was 1992. When they pulled out we felt that it was necessary to put up an environment group because the human rights had gone hand in hand with the environment issue.*

Nadia: Are you saying because the bases had polluted so much?

Pia: Yeah ... And though we were wanting to do just international issues, we got pulled in because Greenpeace came in and we talked about plastics; that they dump plastics in the Philippines. They dump batteries, the pesticides go there They dump all the tobacco from here over there (emphasis added).

It is not surprising that Pia's Environmental Justice activism would pivot on ethnoraciality. She and her family boasted varied political involvement in the Philippines for the uplifting of their people, along with a transnational connection to the pollution (and other) problems in Carson. Among the Filipinx youth activists, as well, most had some transnational connection to the archipelago by way of family ties, summer trips, grassroots organizing, popular culture, and the likes of Manny Pacquiao; this connection existed although none had grown up on the archipelago or could barely recall it if they had. The contrast between the Philippines and the soulless white U.S. colonizer was not lost on either generation. It seemed that an activist's own political relationship to Philippine activist networks concretized who "we" were and who we fought for in ethnoracial terms. They believed that the primary cause of their disproportionate pollution was their "of color-ness," rendering them, and their cities here and there, disposable.

Our Imagined Class of People—Asian American Pacific Islanders and Mexican Ethnics

It is important to reiterate, however, that the spotlight on race/ethnicity did not mean that class disappeared from the social justice equation. Upon asking Cindy, the Samoan American elementary school teacher, about the cause of her community's subjugation, she promptly wrung her hands over the relationality of race and socioeconomic status: "America has false images of Samoans as just being *uneducated* football players." What mattered to Cindy was not merely that White America thought of "football player" when they conjured up a Samoan American, it was that they saw an *uneducated* one. She sought to overturn the notion of non-football-playing Samoans as working-class/working-poor by underscoring that within her own family as well as in the broader community, "We have diplomats, we have attorneys, we got government officials—we've got everything you can think of—scientists, that are relatives. So education is a part of our family heritage, our culture. There was never any option of not going to college or not being productive."

Similarly, Filipina American activist Pia had served as a journalist for the Philippine *labor* movement and noted her empathy and support for it, which she would link up with her organizing in the student and women's movements there. In the United States she supported the labor movement (her first protest march), as well. A Filipino American youth activist, Daniel, spoke about class (and race) in direct relation to why his Carson community faced disproportionate environmental pollution from oil refineries and the movement of goods via ports, railyards, and freeways:

The people that are kind of high-income on the hills, they don't get all that stuff or experience all that stuff. And if you noticed, we're very crowded in ... A lot of the garages are actually converted into houses because there is too much people in the house living there can't afford to buy a new house so they convert their garages into homes And, like the ports, they're very close to Carson, Long Beach. There is a lot of people that are minorities; the Latino communities, the African American community. And if you go by San Pedro, that big ridge, there's also a port there, and I've been by there; there is also the low income and the Latinos and the African Americans It probably, really, it has to do with the government and that's where we're supposed to be put at. And then keep the rich rich, and keep the poor poor. So that the rich don't have to experience anything and so that they don't mind it, but then we have to mind it. So we have to continue struggling.

Even as Daniel's identity politics are anchored in being "Filipino"—he is active with PCORE as well as a more radical, transnational Filipinx youth organization—race and class were largely inseparable in his

mind. He seamlessly interwove the racial/ethnic and class injustice that his Carson community and that other people of color suffered in the area, ultimately concluding that the government engineered a class who keep on getting richer at the expense of the poor who keep on getting poorer. Daniel also invoked morality when he said that the rich immorally pollute and accrete wealth to themselves for the single purpose of *not suffering*; let the low-income minorities suffer so that we don't have to—the crux of Foucauldian biopolitics. By and large, the Asian ethnic activists saw race as mediating class.

Just as class was always somewhere in the picture and remained significant for the Asian American activists, the same was true of race/ethnicity among the Latinx activists. Like their Asian American counterparts, the Mexican immigrants did not restrict their identity politics to one axis of inequality and exploitation just because they decided to rally around a master injustice. When I queried the Mexican immigrant activists directly about race as a potential cause of disproportionate pollution, virtually no one denied its salience in determining life outcomes. Almost everyone conceded that elite institutions' neglect had much to do with them being Mexican Latinos, as well. From the in-depth and ethnographic interview exchanges came a patterned series of one- to two-liners that identified racism as a (secondary) culprit. One example comes from soft-spoken, Celia, who remarked:

Celia: It can be because they might think that immigrants only come to take from the country and not give to the country (*Puede ser que tienen en cuenta el inmigrante porque piensan que nomás viene a quitarles en lugar de aportar*).

Nadia: So sometimes do you think it has to do with being Latino, or..?

Celia: Yes.

Concerning the same question my exchange with thirty-year-old Maya, a mother and a newer activist on the scene, went as follows:

Nadia: What do you think about the fact that many are Latinos, and many aren't documented? Do you think that has any bearing on why they over-pollute your neighborhoods?

Maya: Yes. Because they [Latinos] are afraid to speak up, to just say something, because they think they might be deported.

Some of the organizers more explicitly referred to racism, like Erika, a high-energy mother who preferred a more rebellious look, complete with nose ring:

Nadia: Who is the majority that lives here?

Erika: Here is the Hispanos.

Nadia: So are you saying it would be racism too, or..?

Erika: Yeah, *racismo* too!

Friendly, light-hearted, and passionate Yolanda, a middle-aged mother, echoed the same.

Nadia: So, you were mentioning racism. Do you think that you and the other activists moved into a community that was already polluted or do you think that they pollute more in your areas because of racism or because of your lower income? Which came first?

Yolanda: I think it's everything, like, low income and racism too.

It was not surprising, therefore, that the vast majority of Mexican ethnic activists were secondarily active in the movement for immigration reform, one which at its core foregrounded racial/ethnic and citizenship hierarchies. Yet, race could not overtake class oppression in terms of the activists' transnational history and livelihood. The fact that systemic racism was mostly a *nuevo* experience; that, relatedly, the activists demonstrated weaker recognition of it; and that they had been socialized by Latin American norms of

hushed race talk (Roth and Kim 2013; Telles 2006), meant that the many pauses and the “I’m not sure’s” became predictable whenever I asked the activists what role that race might play in their lives and in disproportionate pollution. Although the earlier narratives betray their clear identities as Mexicans, Latinos, and undocumented immigrants, and reveal their finger on the pulse of racism, their exegeses on race/ethnicity did not compare to their fluid ease and proficiency with class rhetoric, groomed as it was by years of internal community meetings; by practice for public testimonials, newspapers, and cameras; and by global human rights and labor migrant discourses. In this way, most of the Latinx activists considered class to mediate race.

To be sure, one could argue that the loose coalition work of the leaders of the area’s various organizations might have coalesced the differing viewpoints of the Asian American and Latinx constituencies. The only groups that often met, however, were PCORE, CFASE, and EYCEJ; all were led by those who had been activists for a longer period than the other residents, and who tended to hold more progressive/anti-capitalist/anarchist viewpoints. In this vein, all three leaders saw racism and classism as equally yoked and pernicious, yet they focused on the activists fighting the good Environmental Justice fight, not on forcing them to conform to their own political ideologies. What proved more significant was knocking on as many doors as possible to convince inactive or apathetic residents that the freeways, ports, railyards, and oil and other industries were causing their families’ maladies, that they would not be deported if they got involved, and that the issues of Environmental Justice were connected to immigration and school reform—whether their constituencies tended to lean towards racism as the cause (Filipinx) or classism as the cause (Latina/o) was secondary to the reality that they and their children were “being killed softly.”

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To come full circle to the opening vignette, recall that the Mexican ethnic activists like Laura made the political choice to broaden the community as much as possible, not only to make room for all marginalized racial/ethnic, legal-status, and polluted-upon groups, but to imagine a community that included privileged allies. That is to say, the embodied community would be too delimited and even seem exclusionary if it were bound by race or ethnicity. Bound by poverty, any ethnoracial grouping who suffered neglect was part of the fray. Yet, in the activists’ eyes, “the community” could also include those (upper) middle class members from environmentally privileged⁶ spaces, so long as higher socioeconomic members empathized and organized with the immigrants; in this way, the embodied community was also imagined and symbolic. I would be reminded of this, as well, when the activists would cite their hope in me to assist their movement by publicizing it to a world that kept them at arm’s length or knew nothing of them at all. Although the activists certainly differentiated between their embodied community and an imagined version of it, they made clear that in the latter collective, one need *not reside* in the same polluted geographic space.

Beyond the imagined rendering of it, the activists bounded their community along axes of embodied classism and embodied racism: those who suffered it, as their illnesses attested, and those who, by dint of their own immoral empathy deficit, did not. The focus of this chapter, then, was to examine and compare the influences behind why the two racial/ethnic groups of activists drew their political boundaries in this manner. In the case of the mostly unauthorized, low-income Mexican immigrants, they pivoted their political identities and boundary-drawing on class inequality given transnational, contextual, and strategic influences. Transnationally and contextually, in Mexico’s rural villages, the activists suffered not the assaults of (nativistic) racism but the terror of poverty. And, in their minds, it was merciless class inequality and exploitation that explained why their U.S. neighborhoods were being polluted upon, neglected, and why their bodies carried the community’s illness.

While poverty, infirmity, and empathy were clear in the Mexican activists’ conceptualization of who belonged in their embodied community, wealth, better health, and most importantly, the indifference that flowed from both, were the clear markers of nonbelonging. In drawing political and moral boundaries thus, the activists revealed a view of poverty as a socially fabricated inequality imposed on them by the

powerful, one that made them sick and perpetually low-income. By extension, the U.S. state's choice to *legalize* their populace would improve not just their health—imperiled by Emergency Room-only options and exclusion from Obamacare (Affordable Care Act)—but also open the vaunted gates of socioeconomic opportunity. By design, however, the state and anti-immigrant civil society continued to “illegalize” them, explaining why the activists’ neighborhoods were polluted upon and why class elites were slow (or loathe) to act on their behalf.

As most of the Asian American activists were not working-class, they had the luxury of not centering class as the source of their disproportionate pollution and, generally, as the main social axis that oppressed them. Beyond being citizens, living here longer, being intensively socialized by American race discourse, and living amongst and engaging daily White America, the transnational reminders of the blunt force of White U.S. (masculine) power in their “homeland” also mattered. To be sure, all first-generation immigrants to the United States, irrespective of race/ethnicity, have to be baptized by American racial fire in order to fully grasp its legacy—and this holds no matter how much they might have previously engaged U.S. influence in their origins (Kim 2006a, 2006b, 2008). Yet, I found that the Asian ethnics’ strong racial consciousness owed in part to their pre-U.S. activism, and their ongoing transnational ties to progressive political movements there. In contrast, the vast majority of Mexican ethnics had not done any political activism in Mexico and were not part of transnational collective mobilizations.

Future research might explore how Mexican society talks about its poor and about class inequality writ large. It would be interesting to see if Mexico’s class discourse similarly dismisses the poor as “ignorant,” “uneducated,” and as bringing down society. It would be a worthy project to compare and contrast with the explicitly racialized class discourse in *El Norte*, one that punishes immigrants of color for not speaking English, doing all the “bad jobs,” having “too many kids,” birthing anchor babies, and/or for invading as rich maternity tourists, draining resources as refugees, and/or being too good at what they do (“foreign competitors”).

Another motive behind the Mexican ethnics’ fingering of class could have been their view that citing white racism and drawing boundaries between “you Anglos” and “us Latinos” might have seemed more incendiary and controversial in colorblind and “post-racial” America. Future research might explore if discourses of race and racism seem less effective in compelling institutional officials into social justice solutions, perhaps even a liability and a countervailing force against it.

Although, to be sure, the Latinx activists were always conscious of race—merely preferring to have class mediate race—my key findings caution against over-determining the salience of race for working-class immigrants of color. I say this with trepidation, as I never want to imply that race has less power than class, especially in relation to race-centered social processes. When racism is the primary cause of disproportionate environmental hazards in non-white communities, however, we might consider all the reasons why a non-white group would not go to race first as the political beast to slay. Doing so would not only allow us to stop analyzing solely as academics, but also see the world through the eyes of the activists who are more directly changing the world. On the same token, we might explore whether weaker racial analyses could unconsciously reinforce colorblind and post-racial discourse in the fight against environmental and other injustices.

What we know across both the Asian American and Mexican ethnic activists is what Lamont (2000) found so crucial to her French and American working classes: that dignity and respect mattered. My findings reveal that dignity and respect are not the only reasons, however. When the groups I study are racialized as intrinsic “foreigners” and non-Americans, their resistance is animated by a worldview of the signal importance of having a community to which one belongs—a form of citizenship that they seek to, and indeed, construct on their own terms.

Notes

1. A note on terminology: Whenever I am conducting, or drawing on others who've conducted, a non-gendered analysis of Latin- and Asian-descent populations, I use Latinx and Filipinx; when it is gendered, I use Latin@ and Filipin@. If and when I use the popular masculine designation of Latino and Filipino, it is because other authors used it thus, unless otherwise qualified.
2. One young woman was working-class and unauthorized, while one young man was from a documented working-class family—both were of the second generation.
3. The groups with the most ethnically diverse staff and membership were PCORE, which included small numbers of Samoan, Cambodian, multiethnic, White, and Black American residents, as well as CBE, which boasted Latinx, Asian, Black and other ethnics as their staff and membership.
4. Here is Marta's original Spanish-language explanation of the italicized part: ...Si ustedes se viven aqui en el barrio en donde nosotros estamos donde yo estoy no simple vayan alla para que sepan lo que es para esta en la contaminacion. Y si cuando ustedes tienen hijos enfermos me van a entender a mi.
5. Spanish-language explanation of italicized part: ...Eso es la realidad tu sabes cuando la gente tiene dinero se va. Pero tienen una mansion hermoso o una vecina vive muy bien. No les interesa.
6. Phrase comes from Park and Pellow (2011).

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